We present extensions to the Online Delay Management Problem on a Single Train Line. While a train travels along the line, it learns at each station how many of the passengers wanting to board the train have a delay of delta. If the train does not wait for them, they get delayed even more since they have to wait for the next train. Otherwise, the train waits and those passengers who were on time are delayed by delta. The problem consists in deciding when to wait in order to minimize the total delay of all passengers on the train line. We provide an improved lower bound on the competitive ratio of any deterministic online algorithm solving the problem using game tree evaluation. For the extension of the original model to two possible passenger delays delta_1 and delta_2, we present a 3-competitive deterministic online algorithm. Moreover, we study an objective function modeling the refund system of the German national railway company, which pays passengers with a delay of at least Delta a part of their ticket price back. In this setting, the aim is to maximize the profit. We show that there cannot be a deterministic competitive online algorithm for this problem and present a 2-competitive randomized algorithm.
In the generalized max flow problem, the aim is to find a maximum flow in a generalized network, i.e., a network with multipliers on the arcs that specify which portion of the flow entering an arc at its tail node reaches its head node. We consider this problem for the class of series-parallel graphs. First, we study the continuous case of the problem and prove that it can be solved using a greedy approach. Based on this result, we present a combinatorial algorithm that runs in O(m*m) time and a dynamic programming algorithm with running time O(m*log(m)) that only computes the maximum flow value but not the flow itself. For the integral version of the problem, which is known to be NP-complete, we present a pseudo-polynomial algorithm.
We introduce a new game, the so-called bin coloring game, in which selfish players control colored items and each player aims at packing its item into a bin with as few different colors as possible. We establish the existence of Nash and strong as well as weakly and strictly Pareto optimal equilibria in these games in the cases of capacitated and uncapacitated bins. For both kinds of games we determine the prices of anarchy and stability concerning those four equilibrium concepts. Furthermore, we show that extreme Nash equilibria, those with minimal or maximal number of colors in a bin, can be found in time polynomial in the number of items for the uncapcitated case.
We present an exact algorithm for computing an earliest arrival flow in a discrete time setting on series-parallel graphs. In contrast to previous results for the earliest arrival flow problem this algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Entwicklung eines Wärmetransportmodells für tiefe geothermische (hydrothermale) Reservoire. Existenz- und Eindeutigkeitsaussagen bezüglich einer schwachen Lösung des vorgestellten Modells werden getätigt. Weiterhin wird ein Verfahren zur Approximation dieser Lösung basierend auf einem linearen Galerkin-Schema dargelegt, wobei sowohl die Konvergenz nachgewiesen als auch eine Konvergenzrate erarbeitet werden.
Im Sommersemester 2008 führte die AG Optimierung, FB Mathematik zusammen mit dem FB Chemie und dem FB Pädagogik ein interdisziplinäres Seminar zur „Fachdidaktik Chemie und Mathematik“ durch. Durch dieses integrative Lehrveranstaltungskonzept sollte die Nachhaltigkeit der Ausbildung gestärkt und die Verknüpfung von Allgemeiner Didaktik mit der Fachdidaktik sowie zwischen verschiedenen Fachbereichen gefördert werden. In dieser speziellen Veranstaltung erarbeiteten sich die Teilnehmer Inhalte in der Schnittmenge von Chemie und Mathematik, nämlich Kristallgeometrie, Analysis und Titration sowie Graphentheorie und Trennverfahren. Ihre Erkenntnisse wurden im Rahmen von Seminarvorträgen präsentiert und ausgearbeitet. Im folgenden Report befinden sich die Ausarbeitungen, welche Lernziele und Kompetenzen, Sach-, Methodische und Didaktische Analysen sowie Unterrichtsentwürfe umfassen.
We prove a general monotonicity result about Nash flows in directed networks and use it for the design of truthful mechanisms in the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs when her edge is used. The costs for each edge are assumed to be linear in the load on the edge. To compensate for these costs, the agents impose tolls for the usage of edges. When nonatomic selfish network users choose their paths through the network independently and each user tries to minimize a weighted sum of her latency and the toll she has to pay to the edges, a Nash flow is obtained. Our monotonicity result implies that the load on an edge in this setting can not increase when the toll on the edge is increased, so the assignment of load to the edges by a Nash flow yields a monotone algorithm. By a well-known result, the monotonicity of the algorithm then allows us to design truthful mechanisms based on the load assignment by Nash flows. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with two-parameter agents, which is a generalization of the case of one-parameter agents considered in a seminal paper of Archer and Tardos. While the private data of an agent in the one-parameter case consists of a single nonnegative real number specifying the agent's cost per unit of load assigned to her, the private data of a two-parameter agent consists of a pair of nonnegative real numbers, where the first one specifies the cost of the agent per unit load as in the one-parameter case, and the second one specifies a fixed cost, which the agent incurs independently of the load assignment. We give a complete characterization of the set of output functions that can be turned into truthful mechanisms for two-parameter agents. Namely, we prove that an output function for the two-parameter setting can be turned into a truthful mechanism if and only if the load assigned to every agent is nonincreasing in the agent's bid for her per unit cost and, for almost all fixed bids for the agent's per unit cost, the load assigned to her is independent of the agent's bid for her fixed cost. When the load assigned to an agent is continuous in the agent's bid for her per unit cost, it must be completely independent of the agent's bid for her fixed cost. These results motivate our choice of linear cost functions without fixed costs for the edges in the selfish routing setting, but the results also seem to be interesting in the context of algorithmic mechanism design themselves.
In this paper we introduce a cooperative game based on the minimum cut tree problem which is also known as multi-terminal maximum flow problem. Minimum cut tree games are shown to be totally balanced and a solution in their core can be obtained in polynomial time. This special core allocation is closely related to the solution of the original graph theoretical problem. We give an example showing that the game is not supermodular in general, however, it is for special cases and for some of those we give an explicit formula for the calculation of the Shapley value.
Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die kanonische Verbindung klassischer globaler Schwerefeldmodellierung in der Konzeption von Stokes (1849) und Neumann (1887) und moderner lokaler Multiskalenberechnung mittels lokalkompakter adaptiver Wavelets. Besonderes Anliegen ist die "Zoom-in"-Ermittlung von Geoidhöhen aus lokal gegebenen Schwereanomalien bzw. Schwerestörungen.
We study the complexity of finding extreme pure Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games and analyse how it depends on the graph topology and the number of users. In our context best and worst equilibria are those with minimum respectively maximum total latency. We establish that both problems can be solved by a Greedy algorithm with a suitable tie breaking rule on parallel links. On series-parallel graphs finding a worst Nash equilibrium is NP-hard for two or more users while finding a best one is solvable in polynomial time for two users and NP-hard for three or more. Additionally we establish NP-hardness in the strong sense for the problem of finding a worst Nash equilibrium on a general acyclic graph.