## Fachbereich Informatik

Many mathematical proofs are hard to generate forhumans and even harder for automated theoremprovers. Classical techniques of automated theoremproving involve the application of basic rules, of built-in special procedures, or of tactics. Melis (Melis 1993)introduced a new method for analogical reasoning inautomated theorem proving. In this paper we showhow the derivational analogy replay method is relatedand extended to encompass analogy-driven proof planconstruction. The method is evaluated by showing theproof plan generation of the Pumping Lemma for con-text free languages derived by analogy with the proofplan of the Pumping Lemma for regular languages.This is an impressive evaluation test for the analogicalreasoning method applied to automated theorem prov-ing, as the automated proof of this Pumping Lemmais beyond the capabilities of any of the current auto-mated theorem provers.

This paper addresses the decomposition of proofs as a means of constructingmethods in plan-based automated theorem proving. It shows also, howdecomposition can beneficially be applied in theorem proving by analogy.Decomposition is also useful for human-style proof presentation. We proposeseveral decomposition techniques that were found to be useful in automatedtheorem proving and give examples of their application.

This paper analyzes how mathematicians prove the-orems. The analysis is based upon several empiricalsources such as reports of mathematicians and math-ematical proofs by analogy. In order to combine thestrength of traditional automated theorem provers withhuman-like capabilities, the questions arise: Whichproblem solving strategies are appropriate? Which rep-resentations have to be employed? As a result of ouranalysis, the following reasoning strategies are recog-nized: proof planning with partially instantiated meth-ods, structuring of proofs, the transfer of subproofs andof reformulated subproofs. We discuss the represent-ation of a component of these reasoning strategies, aswell as its properties. We find some mechanisms neededfor theorem proving by analogy, that are not providedby previous approaches to analogy. This leads us to acomputational representation of new components andprocedures for automated theorem proving systems.

The hallmark of traditional Artificial Intelligence (AI) research is the symbolic representation and processing of knowledge. This is in sharp contrast to many forms of human reasoning, which to an extraordinary extent, rely on cases and (typical) examples. Although these examples could themselves be encoded into logic, this raises the problem of restricting the corresponding model classes to include only the intended models.There are, however, more compelling reasons to argue for a hybrid representa-tion based on assertions as well as examples. The problems of adequacy, availability of information, compactness of representation, processing complexity, and last but not least, results from the psychology of human reasoning, all point to the same conclusion: Common sense reasoning requires different knowledge sources and hybrid reasoning principles that combine symbolic as well as semantic-based inference. In this paper we address the problem of integrating semantic representations of examples into automateddeduction systems. The main contribution is a formal framework for combining sentential with direct representations. The framework consists of a hybrid knowledge base, made up of logical formulae on the one hand and direct representations of examples on the other, and of a hybrid reasoning method based on the resolution calculus. The resulting hybrid resolution calculus is shown to be sound and complete.

Typical instances, that is, instances that are representative for a particular situ-ation or concept, play an important role in human knowledge representationand reasoning, in particular in analogical reasoning. This wellADknown obser-vation has been a motivation for investigations in cognitive psychology whichprovide a basis for our characterization of typical instances within conceptstructures and for a new inference rule for justified analogical reasoning withtypical instances. In a nutshell this paper suggests to augment the proposi-tional knowledge representation system by a non-propositional part consistingof concept structures which may have directly represented instances as ele-ments. The traditional reasoning system is extended by a rule for justifiedanalogical inference with typical instances using information extracted fromboth knowledge representation subsystems.