Planning means constructing a course of actions to achieve a specified set of goals when starting from an initial situation. For example, determining a sequence of actions (a plan) for transporting goods from an initial location to some destination is a typical planning problem in the transportation domain. Many planning problems are of practical interest.
Die Beweisentwicklungsumgebung Omega-Mkrp soll Mathematiker bei einer ihrer Haupttätigkeiten, nämlich dem Beweisen mathematischer Theoreme unterstützen. Diese Unterstützung muß so komfortabel sein, daß die Beweise mit vertretbarem Aufwand formal durchgeführt werden können und daß die Korrektheit der so erzeugten Beweise durch das System sichergestellt wird. Ein solches System wird sich nur dann wirklich durchsetzen, wenn die rechnergestützte Suche nach formalen Beweisen weniger aufwendig und leichter ist, als ohne das System. Um dies zu erreichen, ergeben sich verschiedene Anforderungen an eine solche Entwicklungsumgebung, die wir im einzelnen beschreiben. Diese betreffen insbesondere die Ausdruckskraft der verwendeten Objektsprache, die Möglichkeit, abstrakt über Beweispläne zu reden, die am Menschen orientierte Präsentation der gefundenen Beweise, aber auch die effiziente Unterstützung beim Füllen von Beweislücken. Das im folgenden vorgestellte Omega-Mkrp-System ist eine Synthese der Ansätze des vollautomatischen, des interaktiven und des planbasierten Beweisens und versucht erstmalig die Ergebnisse dieser drei Forschungsrichtungen in einem System zu vereinigen. Dieser Artikel soll eine Übersicht über unsere Arbeit an diesem System geben.
This paper addresses two modi of analogical reasoning. Thefirst modus is based on the explicit representation of the justificationfor the analogical inference. The second modus is based on the repre-sentation of typical instances by concept structures. The two kinds ofanalogical inferences rely on different forms of relevance knowledge thatcause non-monotonicity. While the uncertainty and non-monotonicity ofanalogical inferences is not questioned, a semantic characterization ofanalogical reasoning has not been given yet. We introduce a minimalmodel semantics for analogical inference with typical instances.
This paper shows how a new approach to theorem provingby analogy is applicable to real maths problems. This approach worksat the level of proof-plans and employs reformulation that goes beyondsymbol mapping. The Heine-Borel theorem is a widely known result inmathematics. It is usually stated in R 1 and similar versions are also truein R 2 , in topology, and metric spaces. Its analogical transfer was proposedas a challenge example and could not be solved by previous approachesto theorem proving by analogy. We use a proof-plan of the Heine-Boreltheorem in R 1 as a guide in automatically producing a proof-plan of theHeine-Borel theorem in R 2 by analogy-driven proof-plan construction.
This paper addresses a model of analogy-driven theorem proving that is more general and cognitively more adequate than previous approaches. The model works at the level ofproof-plans. More precisely, we consider analogy as a control strategy in proof planning that employs a source proof-plan to guide the construction of a proof-plan for the target problem. Our approach includes a reformulation of the source proof-plan. This is in accordance with the well known fact that constructing ananalogy in maths often amounts to first finding the appropriate representation which brings out the similarity of two problems, i.e., finding the right concepts and the right level of abstraction. Several well known theorems were processed by our analogy-driven proof-plan construction that could not be proven analogically by previous approaches.
This paper addresses analogy-driven auto-mated theorem proving that employs a sourceproof-plan to guide the search for a proof-planof the target problem. The approach presen-ted uses reformulations that go beyond symbolmappings and that incorporate frequently usedre-representations and abstractions. Severalrealistic math examples were successfully pro-cessed by our analogy-driven proof-plan con-struction. One challenge example, a Heine-Borel theorem, is discussed here. For this ex-ample the reformulaitons are shown step bystep and the modifying actions are demon-strated.
CL A M is a proof planner, developed by the Dream group in Edinburgh,that mainly operates for inductive proofs. This paper addresses the questionhow an analogy model that I developed independently of CL A M can beapplied to CL A M and it presents analogy-driven proof plan construction as acontrol strategy of CL A M . This strategy is realized as a derivational analogythat includes the reformulation of proof plans. The analogical replay checkswhether the reformulated justifications of the source plan methods hold inthe target as a permission to transfer the method to the target plan. SinceCL A M has very efficient heuristic search strategies, the main purpose ofthe analogy is to suggest lemmas, to replay not commonly loaded methods,to suggest induction variables and induction terms, and to override controlrather than to construct a target proof plan that can be built by CL A Mitself more efficiently.
While most approaches to similarity assessment are oblivious of knowledge and goals, there is ample evidence that these elements of problem solving play an important role in similarity judgements. This paper is concerned with an approach for integrating assessment of similarity into a framework of problem solving that embodies central notions of problem solving like goals, knowledge and learning.
Typical examples, that is, examples that are representative for a particular situationor concept, play an important role in human knowledge representation and reasoning.In real life situations more often than not, instead of a lengthy abstract characteriza-tion, a typical example is used to describe the situation. This well-known observationhas been the motivation for various investigations in experimental psychology, whichalso motivate our formal characterization of typical examples, based on a partial orderfor their typicality. Reasoning by typical examples is then developed as a special caseof analogical reasoning using the semantic information contained in the correspondingconcept structures. We derive new inference rules by replacing the explicit informa-tion about connections and similarity, which are normally used to formalize analogicalinference rules, by information about the relationship to typical examples. Using theseinference rules analogical reasoning proceeds by checking a related typical example,this is a form of reasoning based on semantic information from cases.