Year of publication
- non-overlapping constraints (2)
- rectangular packing (2)
- : multiple criteria optimization (1)
- IMRT planning (1)
- IMRT planning on adaptive volume structures – a significant advance of computational complexity (1)
- Parteto surface (1)
- Shapley Value (1)
- VCG payment scheme (1)
- Winner Determination Problem (WDP) (1)
- adaptive triangulation (1)
- Trade-off bounds and their effect in multi-criteria IMRT planning (2009)
- One approach to multi-criteria IMRT planning is to automatically calculate a data set of Pareto-optimal plans for a given planning problem in a first phase, and then interactively explore the solution space and decide for the clinically best treatment plan in a second phase. The challenge of computing the plan data set is to assure that all clinically meaningful plans are covered and that as many as possible clinically irrelevant plans are excluded to keep computation times within reasonable limits. In this work, we focus on the approximation of the clinically relevant part of the Pareto surface, the process that consititutes the first phase. It is possible that two plans on the Parteto surface have a very small, clinically insignificant difference in one criterion and a significant difference in one other criterion. For such cases, only the plan that is clinically clearly superior should be included into the data set. To achieve this during the Pareto surface approximation, we propose to introduce bounds that restrict the relative quality between plans, so called tradeoff bounds. We show how to integrate these trade-off bounds into the approximation scheme and study their effects.
- Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows (2011)
- In this paper we study the possibilities of sharing profit in combinatorial procurement auctions and exchanges. Bundles of heterogeneous items are offered by the sellers, and the buyers can then place bundle bids on sets of these items. That way, both sellers and buyers can express synergies between items and avoid the well-known risk of exposure (see, e.g., ). The reassignment of items to participants is known as the Winner Determination Problem (WDP). We propose solving the WDP by using a Set Covering formulation, because profits are potentially higher than with the usual Set Partitioning formulation, and subsidies are unnecessary. The achieved benefit is then to be distributed amongst the participants of the auction, a process which is known as profit sharing. The literature on profit sharing provides various desirable criteria. We focus on three main properties we would like to guarantee: Budget balance, meaning that no more money is distributed than profit was generated, individual rationality, which guarantees to each player that participation does not lead to a loss, and the core property, which provides every subcoalition with enough money to keep them from separating. We characterize all profit sharing schemes that satisfy these three conditions by a monetary flow network and state necessary conditions on the solution of the WDP for the existence of such a profit sharing. Finally, we establish a connection to the famous VCG payment scheme [2, 8, 19], and the Shapley Value .