Typical examples, that is, examples that are representative for a particular situationor concept, play an important role in human knowledge representation and reasoning.In real life situations more often than not, instead of a lengthy abstract characteriza-tion, a typical example is used to describe the situation. This well-known observationhas been the motivation for various investigations in experimental psychology, whichalso motivate our formal characterization of typical examples, based on a partial orderfor their typicality. Reasoning by typical examples is then developed as a special caseof analogical reasoning using the semantic information contained in the correspondingconcept structures. We derive new inference rules by replacing the explicit informa-tion about connections and similarity, which are normally used to formalize analogicalinference rules, by information about the relationship to typical examples. Using theseinference rules analogical reasoning proceeds by checking a related typical example,this is a form of reasoning based on semantic information from cases.
This report presents the main ideas underlyingtheOmegaGamma mkrp-system, an environmentfor the development of mathematical proofs. The motivation for the development ofthis system comes from our extensive experience with traditional first-order theoremprovers and aims to overcome some of their shortcomings. After comparing the benefitsand drawbacks of existing systems, we propose a system architecture that combinesthe positive features of different types of theorem-proving systems, most notably theadvantages of human-oriented systems based on methods (our version of tactics) andthe deductive strength of traditional automated theorem provers.In OmegaGamma mkrp a user first states a problem to be solved in a typed and sorted higher-order language (called POST ) and then applies natural deduction inference rules inorder to prove it. He can also insert a mathematical fact from an integrated data-base into the current partial proof, he can apply a domain-specific problem-solvingmethod, or he can call an integrated automated theorem prover to solve a subprob-lem. The user can also pass the control to a planning component that supports andpartially automates his long-range planning of a proof. Toward the important goal ofuser-friendliness, machine-generated proofs are transformed in several steps into muchshorter, better-structured proofs that are finally translated into natural language.This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 314 (D2, D3)
Typical instances, that is, instances that are representative for a particular situ-ation or concept, play an important role in human knowledge representationand reasoning, in particular in analogical reasoning. This wellADknown obser-vation has been a motivation for investigations in cognitive psychology whichprovide a basis for our characterization of typical instances within conceptstructures and for a new inference rule for justified analogical reasoning withtypical instances. In a nutshell this paper suggests to augment the proposi-tional knowledge representation system by a non-propositional part consistingof concept structures which may have directly represented instances as ele-ments. The traditional reasoning system is extended by a rule for justifiedanalogical inference with typical instances using information extracted fromboth knowledge representation subsystems.
The hallmark of traditional Artificial Intelligence (AI) research is the symbolic representation and processing of knowledge. This is in sharp contrast to many forms of human reasoning, which to an extraordinary extent, rely on cases and (typical) examples. Although these examples could themselves be encoded into logic, this raises the problem of restricting the corresponding model classes to include only the intended models.There are, however, more compelling reasons to argue for a hybrid representa-tion based on assertions as well as examples. The problems of adequacy, availability of information, compactness of representation, processing complexity, and last but not least, results from the psychology of human reasoning, all point to the same conclusion: Common sense reasoning requires different knowledge sources and hybrid reasoning principles that combine symbolic as well as semantic-based inference. In this paper we address the problem of integrating semantic representations of examples into automateddeduction systems. The main contribution is a formal framework for combining sentential with direct representations. The framework consists of a hybrid knowledge base, made up of logical formulae on the one hand and direct representations of examples on the other, and of a hybrid reasoning method based on the resolution calculus. The resulting hybrid resolution calculus is shown to be sound and complete.
This paper addresses two modi of analogical reasoning. Thefirst modus is based on the explicit representation of the justificationfor the analogical inference. The second modus is based on the repre-sentation of typical instances by concept structures. The two kinds ofanalogical inferences rely on different forms of relevance knowledge thatcause non-monotonicity. While the uncertainty and non-monotonicity ofanalogical inferences is not questioned, a semantic characterization ofanalogical reasoning has not been given yet. We introduce a minimalmodel semantics for analogical inference with typical instances.
The semantics of everyday language and the semanticsof its naive translation into classical first-order language consider-ably differ. An important discrepancy that is addressed in this paperis about the implicit assumption what exists. For instance, in thecase of universal quantification natural language uses restrictions andpresupposes that these restrictions are non-empty, while in classi-cal logic it is only assumed that the whole universe is non-empty.On the other hand, all constants mentioned in classical logic arepresupposed to exist, while it makes no problems to speak about hy-pothetical objects in everyday language. These problems have beendiscussed in philosophical logic and some adequate many-valuedlogics were developed to model these phenomena much better thanclassical first-order logic can do. An adequate calculus, however, hasnot yet been given. Recent years have seen a thorough investigationof the framework of many-valued truth-functional logics. UnfortuADnately, restricted quantifications are not truth-functional, hence theydo not fit the framework directly. We solve this problem by applyingrecent methods from sorted logics.
Mechanised reasoning systems and computer algebra systems have apparentlydifferent objectives. Their integration is, however, highly desirable, since in manyformal proofs both of the two different tasks, proving and calculating, have to beperformed. Even more importantly, proof and computation are often interwoven andnot easily separable. In the context of producing reliable proofs, the question howto ensure correctness when integrating a computer algebra system into a mechanisedreasoning system is crucial. In this contribution, we discuss the correctness prob-lems that arise from such an integration and advocate an approach in which thecalculations of the computer algebra system are checked at the calculus level of themechanised reasoning system. This can be achieved by adding a verbose mode to thecomputer algebra system which produces high-level protocol information that can beprocessed by an interface to derive proof plans. Such a proof plan in turn can beexpanded to proofs at different levels of abstraction, so the approach is well-suited forproducing a high-level verbalised explication as well as for a low-level machine check-able calculus-level proof. We present an implementation of our ideas and exemplifythem using an automatically solved extended example.
We present a mathematical knowledge base containing the factual know-ledge of the first of three parts of a textbook on semi-groups and automata,namely "P. Deussen: Halbgruppen und Automaten". Like almost all math-ematical textbooks this textbook is not self-contained, but there are somealgebraic and set-theoretical concepts not being explained. These concepts areadded to the knowledge base. Furthermore there is knowledge about the nat-ural numbers, which is formalized following the first paragraph of "E. Landau:Grundlagen der Analysis".The data base is written in a sorted higher-order logic, a variant of POST ,the working language of the proof development environment OmegaGamma mkrp. We dis-tinguish three different types of knowledge: axioms, definitions, and theorems.Up to now, there are only 2 axioms (natural numbers and cardinality), 149definitions (like that for a semi-group), and 165 theorems. The consistency ofsuch knowledge bases cannot be proved in general, but inconsistencies may beimported only by the axioms. Definitions and theorems should not lead to anyinconsistency since definitions form conservative extensions and theorems areproved to be consequences.