Kaiserslautern - Fachbereich Mathematik
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Selfish Bin Coloring
(2009)
We introduce a new game, the so-called bin coloring game, in which selfish players control colored items and each player aims at packing its item into a bin with as few different colors as possible. We establish the existence of Nash and strong as well as weakly and strictly Pareto optimal equilibria in these games in the cases of capacitated and uncapacitated bins. For both kinds of games we determine the prices of anarchy and stability concerning those four equilibrium concepts. Furthermore, we show that extreme Nash equilibria, those with minimal or maximal number of colors in a bin, can be found in time polynomial in the number of items for the uncapcitated case.
Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Entwicklung eines Wärmetransportmodells für tiefe geothermische (hydrothermale) Reservoire. Existenz- und Eindeutigkeitsaussagen bezüglich einer schwachen Lösung des vorgestellten Modells werden getätigt. Weiterhin wird ein Verfahren zur Approximation dieser Lösung basierend auf einem linearen Galerkin-Schema dargelegt, wobei sowohl die Konvergenz nachgewiesen als auch eine Konvergenzrate erarbeitet werden.
Im Sommersemester 2008 führte die AG Optimierung, FB Mathematik zusammen mit dem FB Chemie und dem FB Pädagogik ein interdisziplinäres Seminar zur „Fachdidaktik Chemie und Mathematik“ durch. Durch dieses integrative Lehrveranstaltungskonzept sollte die Nachhaltigkeit der Ausbildung gestärkt und die Verknüpfung von Allgemeiner Didaktik mit der Fachdidaktik sowie zwischen verschiedenen Fachbereichen gefördert werden. In dieser speziellen Veranstaltung erarbeiteten sich die Teilnehmer Inhalte in der Schnittmenge von Chemie und Mathematik, nämlich Kristallgeometrie, Analysis und Titration sowie Graphentheorie und Trennverfahren. Ihre Erkenntnisse wurden im Rahmen von Seminarvorträgen präsentiert und ausgearbeitet. Im folgenden Report befinden sich die Ausarbeitungen, welche Lernziele und Kompetenzen, Sach-, Methodische und Didaktische Analysen sowie Unterrichtsentwürfe umfassen.
We prove a general monotonicity result about Nash flows in directed networks and use it for the design of truthful mechanisms in the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs when her edge is used. The costs for each edge are assumed to be linear in the load on the edge. To compensate for these costs, the agents impose tolls for the usage of edges. When nonatomic selfish network users choose their paths through the network independently and each user tries to minimize a weighted sum of her latency and the toll she has to pay to the edges, a Nash flow is obtained. Our monotonicity result implies that the load on an edge in this setting can not increase when the toll on the edge is increased, so the assignment of load to the edges by a Nash flow yields a monotone algorithm. By a well-known result, the monotonicity of the algorithm then allows us to design truthful mechanisms based on the load assignment by Nash flows. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with two-parameter agents, which is a generalization of the case of one-parameter agents considered in a seminal paper of Archer and Tardos. While the private data of an agent in the one-parameter case consists of a single nonnegative real number specifying the agent's cost per unit of load assigned to her, the private data of a two-parameter agent consists of a pair of nonnegative real numbers, where the first one specifies the cost of the agent per unit load as in the one-parameter case, and the second one specifies a fixed cost, which the agent incurs independently of the load assignment. We give a complete characterization of the set of output functions that can be turned into truthful mechanisms for two-parameter agents. Namely, we prove that an output function for the two-parameter setting can be turned into a truthful mechanism if and only if the load assigned to every agent is nonincreasing in the agent's bid for her per unit cost and, for almost all fixed bids for the agent's per unit cost, the load assigned to her is independent of the agent's bid for her fixed cost. When the load assigned to an agent is continuous in the agent's bid for her per unit cost, it must be completely independent of the agent's bid for her fixed cost. These results motivate our choice of linear cost functions without fixed costs for the edges in the selfish routing setting, but the results also seem to be interesting in the context of algorithmic mechanism design themselves.