Kaiserslautern - Fachbereich Mathematik
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Report (121) (remove)
Keywords
- Mathematikunterricht (6)
- Modellierung (6)
- modelling (6)
- praxisorientiert (6)
- Elastoplastizität (4)
- Lineare Algebra (4)
- linear algebra (4)
- mathematical education (4)
- praxis orientated (4)
- Elastoplasticity (3)
Faculty / Organisational entity
Algebraic Systems Theory
(2004)
Control systems are usually described by differential equations, but their properties of interest are most naturally expressed in terms of the system trajectories, i.e., the set of all solutions to the equations. This is the central idea behind the so-called "behavioral approach" to systems and control theory. On the other hand, the manipulation of linear systems of differential equations can be formalized using algebra, more precisely, module theory and homological methods ("algebraic analysis"). The relationship between modules and systems is very rich, in fact, it is a categorical duality in many cases of practical interest. This leads to algebraic characterizations of structural systems properties such as autonomy, controllability, and observability. The aim of these lecture notes is to investigate this module-system correspondence. Particular emphasis is put on the application areas of one-dimensional rational systems (linear ODE with rational coefficients), and multi-dimensional constant systems (linear PDE with constant coefficients).
We study the efficient computation of Nash and strong equilibria in weighted bottleneck games. In such a game different players interact on a set of resources in the way that every player chooses a subset of the resources as her strategy. The cost of a single resource depends on the total weight of players choosing it and the personal cost every player tries to minimize is the cost of the most expensive resource in her strategy, the bottleneck value. To derive efficient algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in these games, we generalize a tranformation of a bottleneck game into a special congestion game introduced by Caragiannis et al. [1]. While investigating the transformation we introduce so-called lexicographic games, in which the aim of a player is not only to minimize her bottleneck value but to lexicographically minimize the ordered vector of costs of all resources in her strategy. For the special case of network bottleneck games, i.e., the set of resources are the edges of a graph and the strategies are paths, we analyse different Greedy type methods and their limitations for extension-parallel and series-parallel graphs.
Das sind die Texte der Vorlesungen, die ich im Dezember 1988 - März 1989 an der Universität Kaiserslautern hielt. Die Sektionen 1-4 enthalten Materialien, die in Russisch im Buch [33] und in früheren Arbeiten [27,28] [30-33] publiziert sind.
Sektion 5 enthält neue Ergebnisse, die wir während meines Aufenthaltes in Kaiserslautern in Zusammenarbeit mit Herrn Robert Plato
(TU Berlin) ausarbeiteten (siehe [21,22]). Sektion 6 ist eine Erweiterung der Arbeit [31].
We prove a general monotonicity result about Nash flows in directed networks and use it for the design of truthful mechanisms in the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs when her edge is used. The costs for each edge are assumed to be linear in the load on the edge. To compensate for these costs, the agents impose tolls for the usage of edges. When nonatomic selfish network users choose their paths through the network independently and each user tries to minimize a weighted sum of her latency and the toll she has to pay to the edges, a Nash flow is obtained. Our monotonicity result implies that the load on an edge in this setting can not increase when the toll on the edge is increased, so the assignment of load to the edges by a Nash flow yields a monotone algorithm. By a well-known result, the monotonicity of the algorithm then allows us to design truthful mechanisms based on the load assignment by Nash flows. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with two-parameter agents, which is a generalization of the case of one-parameter agents considered in a seminal paper of Archer and Tardos. While the private data of an agent in the one-parameter case consists of a single nonnegative real number specifying the agent's cost per unit of load assigned to her, the private data of a two-parameter agent consists of a pair of nonnegative real numbers, where the first one specifies the cost of the agent per unit load as in the one-parameter case, and the second one specifies a fixed cost, which the agent incurs independently of the load assignment. We give a complete characterization of the set of output functions that can be turned into truthful mechanisms for two-parameter agents. Namely, we prove that an output function for the two-parameter setting can be turned into a truthful mechanism if and only if the load assigned to every agent is nonincreasing in the agent's bid for her per unit cost and, for almost all fixed bids for the agent's per unit cost, the load assigned to her is independent of the agent's bid for her fixed cost. When the load assigned to an agent is continuous in the agent's bid for her per unit cost, it must be completely independent of the agent's bid for her fixed cost. These results motivate our choice of linear cost functions without fixed costs for the edges in the selfish routing setting, but the results also seem to be interesting in the context of algorithmic mechanism design themselves.