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Competitiveness and Spiteful Behavior

  • I report on two experiments, which were designed to test theoretical predictions about individual behavior in a duopolistic setting. With quantity being the choice variable a simultaneous Cournot game and a sequential Stackelberg game were tested over two periods. The key feature of both models was that players were able to lower marginal cost for period two if they successfully outperformed their competition in period one in terms of profit. Experimental results suggest that in the Cournot game players are very competitive in period one but become Cournot players in period two. In the Stackelberg game Cournot play is modal, suggesting that players have preferences for equality in payoffs, which maybe brought about by punishment of Stackelberg followers and fear of punishment of Stackelberg leaders . Overall, players earned more money in the Stackelberg game than in the Cournot game.
Author:Maik Kecinski
URN (permanent link):urn:nbn:de:hbz:386-kluedo-33753
Advisor:Thomas Riechmann
Document Type:Doctoral Thesis
Language of publication:English
Publication Date:2012/12/14
Year of Publication:2012
Publishing Institute:Technische Universität Kaiserslautern
Granting Institute:Technische Universität Kaiserslautern
Acceptance Date of the Thesis:2012/07/12
Date of the Publication (Server):2012/12/14
Number of page:181
Faculties / Organisational entities:Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC-Cassification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):Standard gemäß KLUEDO-Leitlinien vom 10.09.2012