TY  - RPRT
A1  - Epstein, Leah
A1  - Krumke, Sven O.
A1  - Levin, Asaf
A1  - Sperber, Heike
T1  - Selfish Bin Coloring
N2  - We introduce a new game, the so-called bin coloring game, in which selfish players control colored items and each player aims at packing its item into a bin with as few different colors as possible. We establish the existence of Nash and strong as well as weakly and strictly Pareto optimal equilibria in these games in the cases of capacitated and uncapacitated bins. For both kinds of games we determine the prices of anarchy and stability concerning those four equilibrium concepts. Furthermore, we show that extreme Nash equilibria, those with minimal or maximal number of colors in a bin, can be found in time polynomial in the number of items for the uncapcitated case.
T3  - Report in Wirtschaftsmathematik (WIMA Report) - 123 
KW  - algorithmic game theory
KW  - bin coloring
KW  - Nash equilibria
KW  - strong equilibria
KW  - weakly/ strictly pareto optima
KW  - price of anarchy
KW  - price of stability
Y1  - 2009
UR  - https://kluedo.ub.uni-kl.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2145
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:386-kluedo-16242
ER  -